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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Bountiful City ("the City") concurs with the jurisdictional 
statement in appellant's ("plaintiff's") brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the court below erred in ruling that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-3(2) provides absolute immunity to municipalities 
for the construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm 
systems; and whether, if so interpreted, the statute violates 
the equal-protection provision of the Utah Constitution. 
2. Whether the court below erred in ruling that Article I, 
Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not self-executing; and 
in ruling that, even if that section were self-executing, 
damages recoverable thereunder are limited to damages to private 
property that are the necessary or unavoidable consequences of 
governmental action, and not damages resulting from uninten-
tional or negligent conduct. 
3. Whether the court below erred in ruling that Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10.5 is not applicable to this action because it is 
limited to situations where private property is intentionally or 
unavoidably damaged for public use; and because Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10.5 creates new substantive rights and thus is not 
retroactive to the claims against the City predating the enact-
ment of that section. 
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4. Whether the court below erred in ruling that there was 
no basis for an implied contract claim against the City. 
5. Whether the court below erred in ruling that none of 
the facts suggested or set forth in the Amended Complaint are 
sufficient to allege a taking within the purview of the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE 
INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(2): 
The management of flood waters and other natural dis-
asters and the construction, repair, and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities are 
considered to be governmental functions, and govern-
mental entities and their officers and employees are 
immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting 
from those activities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is 
waived for the recovery of compensation from the gov-
ernmental entity when the governmental entity has taken 
or damaged private property without just compensation. 
Compensation and damages shall be assessed according 
to the requirements of Chapter 34, Title 78. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4: 
Before property can be taken, it must appear: 
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is 
a use authorized by law; 
2. That the taking is necessary to such use 
• • • • 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
For purposes of this appeal, the City does not contest the 
Statement of the Case with its statement of Relevant Facts set 
forth by plaintiff. Nevertheless, there are other facts of 
record relevant to the issues to be determined by the Court: 
1. In 1983, the City experienced substantial flooding in 
several areas. The floodings affected the Fashion Village Mall 
("Mall") when water in Mill Creek, a natural water channel run-
ning adjacent to the south wall of the mall, overran the creek 
banks and deposited debris against the south wall of the Mall. 
See Plaintiff's Brief, Addendum, pp. 25-28. 
2. After the flood waters receded, Mall representatives 
requested the City to make improvements to the Mill Creek 
channel at the mall location in order to improve the flood 
capacity of the creek, ^d. 
3. The City added the Mall/Mill Creek project to its flood 
control construction projects list, but other more pressing 
flood control projects took priority over the Mall project. Id-
4. In 1985, the City contracted for the design, construc-
tion and financing of a number of flood control projects in the 
City, including the Mill Creek channel improvement. The City 
constructed the projects, including the Mall/Mill Creek project, 
with Davis County flood control funds, as well as state disaster 
relief funds. I_d. at pp. 29-31. 
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5. The City let bids on the project and awarded the con-
struction contract to McNeil Construction, a co-defendant in 
this action. The contract called for the construction of a 
concrete channel for Mill Creek at the Mall location. Accord-
ing to plaintiff's Complaint, this channel construction caused 
or contributed to plaintiff's alleged injury. Jd. at pp. 27-48. 
6. Plaintiff does not allege in its Complaint or Amended 
Complaint that the City intentionally damaged its property or 
that the damages sustained were a necessary or unavoidable 
result of the construction of the flood control improvements. 
Rather, plaintiff alleges that the contract between the City 
and McNeil Construction expressly provided that the contractor 
"protect as may be necessary all foundations and other parts of 
all existing structures adjacent and adjoining the site of the 
project, which are in any way affected by the excavations or 
other operations connected with the completion of the work under 
the contract," and do the work in such a way as "to avoid damage 
to adjoining property." Id. at pp. 7-8, 65-66. 
7. Allegedly because the City or its contractor did not 
take reasonable precautions, plaintiff sustained damages to its 
property when the contractor diverted Mill Creek over or against 
plaintiff's property during installation of the channel. Ld. at 
pp. 8-10, 65-68. 
8. Plaintiff claims the construction of the improvement 
resulted in the following damages: 
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(a) Loss of income; 
(b) Diminution in value of its Mall; 
(c) Costs of repair to its Mall roof, floors, walls, 
plumbing, sewer, and fill; and 
(d) Reclamation of vegetation behind the south wall 
of the Mall. 
Id. at pp. 10, 68. 
9. Plaintiff does not allege that the actions of the City 
or its contractor have deprived plaintiff of all use of its 
property, even temporarily, or that the flow causing the alleged 
damages will recur. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Assuming that the legislature employed the words in 
§ 63-30-3 advisedly, the statute provides absolute immunity to 
municipalities engaged in flood control improvements. Such an 
interpretation does not violate equal-protection standards under 
the Utah Constitution because the distinctions made by the 
statute reasonably tend to protect monies in the state disaster 
relief fund as well as the treasuries of the municipalities 
engaged in flood control measures, in order to ensure the gov-
ernment's ability to discharge its wholly public responsibility 
with regard to flood control. 
2. Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution requir-
ing compensation where private property is damaged for public 
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use does not allow plaintiff to recover in this case because 
that section of the constitution is not self-executing. The 
legislative waiver enabling recovery under that section was not 
passed until two years after the action at issue in this case. 
At any rate, damages recoverable under that section are limited 
to those damages that are necessary or unavoidable consequences 
of governmental action. Here, plaintiff has alleged damages 
that are at most unintentional and unnecessary consequences of 
the improvement at issue. 
3. Section 63-30-10.5 of the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act, which enables a plaintiff to recover for the taking or 
damaging of private property for public use under Article I, 
Section 22, does not apply to this case for several reasons: 
1) the statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did 
not exist prior to 1987 and thus cannot be applied retroactiv-
ely; 2) the statute does not contemplate suits where damages 
are unnecessary, and not the unavoidable consequence of the 
governmental activity; and 3) the Governmental Immunity Act 
itself does not apply the waiver of 63-30-10.5 to suits where 
damages were caused by the managing of flood waters. 
4. Plaintiff's contract claim is based wholly upon an 
easement for a right-of-way, which under its express terms gave 
rise to no obligation by the City, and which the City did not 
even sign. Any rights plaintiff acquires by virtue of its 
status as the owner of a servient tenement do not rise to the 
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level of contractual rights and remedies sufficient to allow 
this case to fall within the waiver of governmental immunity 
for contractual obligations. 
5. By its Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiff asked this 
Court to take a position taken by no other court, and hold that 
damages caused by a single flooding, which did not permanently 
invade plaintiff's property, or completely destroy it, and which 
there is no allegation will ever recur, constitute a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment. The great weight of authority is 
that such alleged damages, even if proven, do not rise to the 
level of a taking. Thus the City maintains that : aintiff's 
taking claim under the Fifth Amendment was appropriately dis-
missed as a matter of law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 63-30-3 IS IN ACCORD WITH THE PLAIN 
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE AND REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiff's first point is that § 63-30-3 of the Governmen-
tal Immunity Act cannot be read to provide absolute immunity to 
municipalities engaged in flood control construction because, if 
so interpreted, the statute violates the equal-protection clause 
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of the Utah Constitution. However, the trial court's reading 
is in accord with the plain language of the statute, and the 
statute does not violate equal protection standards. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 Creates Absolute Immunity for 
Municipalities Engaged in Flood Control Construction. 
In response to flooding which began in the spring of 1983, 
and which caused Utah's governor to declare a state of emer-
gency, the Utah legislature passed a "Flood Relief" bill during 
the 1984 budget session. See 1984 Senate Bill 97. The bill 
amended § 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The 
amended section, with amended portions underlined, reads as 
follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [Act] 
chapter all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally owned hospital, 
nursing home, or other governmental health care facil-
ity, and from an improved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be govern-
mental functions, and governmental entities and their 
officers and employees are immune from suit for any 
injury or damage resulting from those activities. 
See 1984 Utah Laws, Ch. 33 § 3. 
At issue is the language of the second paragraph quoted 
above. Plaintiff insists that it be interpreted as qualified 
by the first paragraph, so as to provide only partial immunity 
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to municipalities engaged in flood control efforts. Neverthe-
less, this Court has succinctly stated that the courts of this 
state must "[assume] that the terms of the statute are used ad-
visedly and should be given an interpretation and application 
which is in accord with their usually accepted meanings." Board 
of Ed. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 
1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). See also Grant v. Utah State Land 
Board, 485 P.2d 1035, 1036-37 (Utah 1971) ("foundational rules 
require that we assume that each term of the statute was used 
advisedly"). 
In the face of disastrous flooding and a declared state of 
emergency, the legislature here used the terms "governmental 
entities . . . are immune from suit for any injury . . . resul-
ting from [the management of flood waters and the construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems]." 1984 Utah 
Laws, Ch. 33, § 3 (emphasis added). Contrary to applicable case 
law, plaintiffs proposed interpretation renders meaningless 
the last phrase of the amended paragraph wherein the legislature 
stated that cities and their employees "are immune from suit." 
Id. Under the rules set forth in Board of Ed. of Granite 
School Dist. v. Salt Lake County and Grant v. Utah State Land 
Board, this Court should reject plaintiff's proposed interpre-
tation of the statute. 
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B. The Lower Court's Holding that the Statute Grants 
Absolute Immunity Does Not Render the Statute 
Unconstitutional. 
Plaintiff cites Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 5 (1989), and Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft 
Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), to argue that the statute, as 
interpreted by the lower court, violates the equal-protection 
clause of the Utah constitution. See Appellant's Brief, at 
pp. 8-11. Plaintiff argues that because it has a right to a 
remedy under the open-courts clause of the Utah constitution, 
the standard of review in this case should have more bite than 
mere minimum scrutiny. According to plaintiff, when the statute 
is scrutinized at a vaguely defined higher level, it fails to 
provide equal protection. To avoid this result, plaintiff 
argues, the statute should be interpreted as providing only 
qualified immunity. Id. 
Condemarin and its predecessors, however, are distinguish-
able from the instant case. The Court's heightened scrutiny of 
the statutes at issue there can not reasonably be applied to the 
statute at issue in this case. When § 63-30-3 is analyzed ac-
cording to appropriate equal protection standards, it does not 
violate the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution, 
and there is no need for this Court to adopt plaintiff's 
strained interpretation of the statute. 
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i. A Heightened Scrutiny Standard is Inapplicable to 
the Statute at issue in this Case. 
In Condemarin, as in Berry ex rel. Berry, the right affec-
ted by the statute at issue was a right guaranteed under the 
open-courts provision to a remedy for personal injury. In 
Condemarin, a majority of this Court reasoned that because the 
right was guaranteed under the open-courts provision, a statute 
restricting the right should be scrutinized according to Ha 
heightened standard of review under equal protection." 
Condemarin, 107 Utah Adv. Rep., at 11, 20, 23-24. 
The Court was careful to point out, however, that the 
statute affected the right to sue a governmental entity engaged 
in a proprietary function, a right unaffected by sovereign im-
munity at common-law. The Court noted that the right in fact 
preexisted the enactment of the open-courts provision in the 
Utah constitution: 
The defendants in this case take the position that 
because sovereign immunity was a well-settled 
principle at the time the Utah constitution as 
adopted, the challenged provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act do not deprive plaintiffs of 
any remedies or property rights. This analysis 
overlooks the fact that at common law the proprietary 
or non-governmental functions of the government 
entities were not protected from liability in Utah, 
nor were their employees who performed those functions. 
* * * 
. . . Those arguments can only be persuasive if real, 
essential governmental functions are at issue. They 
do not have the same weight if non-essential, non-
governmental functions are involved. 
* * * 
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. . . In the present case, the legislature has not only 
limited recovery, but it has also extended partial gov-
ernmental immunity to restrict rights which existed of 
common law. Therefore, I would apply a heightened 
standard of review under equal protection. 
See Condemarin v. University Hospital, 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7-8 
(1989) (emphasis in original). In his separate concurring 
opinion. Justice Stewart noted as follows: 
Beyond that, the test ['whether the governmental acti-
vity under consideration is of such a unique nature 
that it can only be performed by a governmental agency 
or that it is essential to the core of governmental 
activity'] articulates the core value protected by gov-
ernmental immunity—providing protection to the public 
treasury and tax revenues against overwhelming losses 
so that the essential functions of government will not 
be imperiled. The test also identifies where the con-
stitutional right of a person to have a remedy for 
personal injury begins under Article I, Section 11 of 
the Utah constitution as against a governmental agency, 
and where the governmental right to immunity from such 
lawsuits stops. 
Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
By contrast the governmental activity the legislature seeks 
to protect with the statute at issue here is the management of 
flood waters. The management of flood waters is a "core" 
governmental function, and that function can only be performed 
by a governmental agency. Governmental entities were clearly 
not liable for such activities at the time of the adoption of 
the open-courts provision of the Utah constitution. As noted 
by this Court in Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983): 
Sovereign immunity—the principle that the state can-
not be sued in its own courts without its consent—was 
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a well-settled principle of American common law at the 
time Utah became a state. Article I, Section 11 of the 
Utah constitution, which prescribes that all courts 
shall be open and persons shall not be barred from 
using them to redress injuries, was not meant to create 
a new remedy or a new right of action. Consequently, 
Article I, Section 11 worked no change in the principle 
of sovereign immunity, and sovereign immunity is not 
unconstitutional under that section. 
658 P.2d at 629 (citations omitted). 
More particularly, it is a common-law principle that the 
sovereign had full immunity from suit for the management of 
flood waters. In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 P. 626 
(1913), the Court held that the sovereign was immune in a situ-
ation where the plaintiff claimed damages resulting from the 
state's construction of a flume, or culvert and undershot, for 
the purpose of protecting a canal against flood water. Subse-
quent cases have upheld the principle of government immunity 
from suit in cases involving flood control or storm systems. 
See, e.g., McKell v. Spanish Fork City, 305 P.2d 1097 (Utah 
1957). 
Accordingly, the fact critical to the Court's opinions in 
Condemarin and Berry ex rel Berry, that the plaintiffs' right 
to a remedy under the open-courts provision was violated by the 
statutes, is not present in this case. The provision of the 
Governmental Immunity Act challenged here simply does not 
deprive plaintiff of any remedies or property rights which it 
enjoyed before enactment of the statute. Thus, plaintiffs 
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equal-protection analysis applying a heightened scrutiny to 
determine the reasonableness of the legislative action is in-
appropriate. 1 
ii. The Test to be Applied to the Statute is the 
Traditional Rational-Basis Standard of Review 
Under the Utah Equal Protection Provision. 
The overwhelming majority of opinions involving equal-
protection attacks on governmental immunity acts employ the 
rational basis test. See, e.g, Aubertin v. Board of Country 
Commissioners of Woodson County, Kansas, 588 F.2d 781 (10th 
Cir. 1978); Boyce v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y. 
1981); Peddycoart v. Burninqham, 354 So. 2d 808 (Ala. 1978); 
Flax v. Kansas Turnpike Authority, 596 P.2d 446 (Kan. 1979); 
Winston v. Reorganized School District, 5-2, 636 S.W.2d 324 
(Mo. 1982); Garcia v. Albuguergue Public Schools Board of 
Education, 622 P.2d 699 (N.M. App. 1981); Paulson v. County of 
Pierce, 664 P.2d 1202 (Wash. 1983). 
Further, on at least four occasions this Court has applied 
the rational basis test when provisions of the Utah Governmental 
1Plaintiff's argument that its right to a full remedy under the 
open-courts provision requires a heightened standard of scrutiny 
fails for another reason. In Berry ex rel. v. Berry, this 
Court stated that Article I, Section 11 was not violated if 
"the law provides an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy. . . . " 717 P.2d at 680. Plaintiffs have 
also sued the City's contractor, architects who designed the 
plaintiff's mall, previous owners of the mall, and various 
individuals and John Does. Here there is no showing that 
plaintiff will be deprived of a full remedy because of the 
immunity of the City. 
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Immunity Act have been attacked on equal protection grounds. 
See, e.g., Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978); Sears v. 
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Utah 1977); Crovder v. Salt Lake 
County, 552 P.2d 656 (Utah 1976); and Gallegos v. Midvale City, 
492 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1972). 
Accordingly, to determine whether the trial court's inter-
pretation of § 63-30-3(2) violates the equal-protection clause 
of the Utah Constitution as plaintiff asserts, this Court should 
apply the rational basis test. 
iii. Appropriate Equal Protection Analysis Results in 
a Finding that § 63-30-3(2) Does not Violate Equal 
Protection Standards. 
In Utah Public Employees Assn. v. State, 610 P.2d 1272 (Utah 
1980), this Court quoted with approval the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in which the principles of analysis under the 
rational basis test were enunciated: 
1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not take from the state the power to 
classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of 
the exercise of a wide scope of discretion in that 
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without 
any reasonable basis, and therefore purely arbitrary. 
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does 
not offend against that clause merely because it is not 
made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice 
it results in some inequity. 
3. When the classification in such a law is called 
in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be 
conceived that would sustain, the existence of that 
state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be 
assumed. 
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4. One who assails the classification in such a law 
must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest 
upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary. 
610 P.2d at 1274 (citations omitted). 
More recently, in Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984), 
this Court applied the rational basis test in a case involving 
an equal-protection attack on the Utah Guest Statute. The Court 
there held that a statute may treat individuals differently and 
yet meet constitutional equal-protection standards if: (1) The 
law applies equally to all persons within a class, and (2) the 
statutory classification and different treatment given the class 
are based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to 
further the statutory objectives. 
Plaintiff argues that § 63-30-3(2) violates equal-protection 
because the distinctions it creates have no reasonable tendency 
to further the legislative objective which plaintiff proposes 
for the statute. See Appellant's Brief, p. 10. Particularly, 
plaintiff assumes that the legislature's objective is "to 
strengthen flood control efforts," and then argues that gran-
ting absolute immunity for flood control efforts, and granting 
only qualified immunity for other governmental functions such 
as road construction, does not reasonably further the legis-
lative objective. However, plaintiff's argument fails in light 
of the above-cited principles. 
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First, there are plausible legislative objectives besides 
the objective "to strengthen flood control efforts." It is a 
matter of record that the City constructed the flood control im-
provement at issue in this case with flood control funds from 
Davis County, and with state disaster relief funds. Clearly 
such funds are not inexhaustible. The objective of the statute 
may have been to protect monies in the state disaster relief 
fund as well as the treasuries of the municipalities engaged in 
flood control measures, in order to ensure the government's 
ability to discharge its wholly public responsibility with 
regard to flood control. 
Second, the distinction the statute makes between persons 
harmed by flood control construction and persons harmed by other 
governmental activities only fails to further the legislative 
objective if it is possible, as plaintiff argues, to equate 
"long-term flood control improvements" and road construction 
and other necessary public improvements. However, there are 
clear differences between the two governmental activities, and 
the distinction in the statute is not arbitrary or unreasonable. 
For example, governmental entities regularly budget for road 
construction and other public improvements as part of their 
normal operating budget and as part of ordinary city business. 
While the plaintiff unilaterally describes the improvement in 
this case as a "long-term flood control improvement", clearly 
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the improvement was not planned by the City as part of its 
normal operating budget nor was it a public improvement under-
taken in the course of ordinary city business. Rather, the 
improvement was constructed in response to severe flooding, with 
the benefit of Davis County flood funds and state disaster 
relief funds. The City could not budget for a natural disaster 
like the flooding of the early 1980's as part of its normal 
fiscal plan. Thus, the statutory distinction granting absolute 
immunity for flood control improvements like the one here, and 
granting only qualified immunity for road construction and other 
public improvements, furthers the legislative purpose of protec-
ting state disaster relief funds, and other flood control funds. 
In short, the distinctions made by the statute at issue here 
reasonably tend to further the legitimate public purpose of pro-
tecting public funds and governmental entities' ability to 
discharge their public responsibilities with regard to flood 
control.. Thus, the statute as interpreted by the lower court 
does not violate the equal-protection provisions of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION IS NOT SELF-EXECUTING; AND WHETHER OR 
NOT IT IS SELF-EXECUTING, DAMAGES RECOVERABLE 
THEREUNDER ARE LIMITED TO DAMAGES THAT ARE 
NECESSARY OR UNAVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES OF 
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION. 
Plaintiff goes to considerable lengths to set forth its po-
sition that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is 
self-executing and constitutes consent by the state to be sued. 
The City maintains that the point is moot given the subsequent 
enactment of § 63-30-10.5, and because whether or not Article I, 
Section 22 is self-executing it does not allow plaintiff to re-
cover damages where at most unintentional and unnecessary damage 
to property is alleged. 
A. Prior Decisions by this Court Establish that Article I, 
Section 22 is not Self-Executing and Subsequent Legis-
lation has Obviated any Need for this Court to Overturn 
its Prior Decisions. 
In 1985, when the improvement at issue was constructed, Utah 
case law clearly established that Article I, Section 22 was not 
self-executing and did not constitute consent by the state to be 
sued. The law on this issue was set forth in the opinions of 
Utah Supreme Court Justices Henriod and Wade. Their opinions, 
concurring opinions, dissents and rebuttals in Sprinqville 
Banking Co. v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157 (Utah 1960); Fairclough v. 
Salt Lake County, 354 P.2d 105 (Utah 1960); and State Road Com-
mission v. Parker, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah 1952) established that 
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consent for the state and governmental entities to be sued was 
a legislative matter, and would not be created nor inferred by 
the courts. 
That rule continued, without any change whatsoever, up to 
the passage by the legislature of the Governmental Immunity Act. 
See Hurst v. Highway Dept., 397 P.2d 71 (Utah 1964); and Sine 
v. Helland, 418 P.2d 979 (Utah 1966). The Governmental Immunity 
Act then "substituted a statutory framework" for the common law 
of sovereign immunity existing prior thereto in the state "to be 
interpreted by the courts and reshaped by the legislature as ne-
cessary from time to time." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
629-30 (Utah 1983). 
The Act originally did not provide consent for the sover-
eign to be sued for "taking" or "damaging" private property for 
public use. The Act retained sovereign immunity, except as 
waived therein. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953). Thus, in Holt 
v. Utah State Road Commission, 522 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973), the 
Court quoted the language of the Act, "except as may be other-
wise provided in this act. . . " to indicate the legislature's 
intention that the act be strictly construed to preserve sover-
eign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein. 
Holt, 522 P.2d at 1287-88. 
In 1987 the legislature enacted § 63-30-10.5, waiving immun-
ity for the "taking or damaging" of private property for public 
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use. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1987). The legislature 
thus obviated any need for this Court to overturn its prior de-
cisions. However, as will be discussed in the following 
points, that section does not allow plaintiff to recover in 
this case. 
B. Even if Article I, Section 22 Were Self-Executing, it 
Would Not Allow Plaintiff to Recover Against Bountiful 
City Under the Facts Alleged in This Case. 
In this case there are no allegations that the damages re-
sulting to plaintiff's property were necessary or unavoidable 
consequences of the City's action. In fact, plaintiff affirma-
tively alleges that the contract between the City and its 
contractor expressly provided that the contractor would 
construct the flood control system in such a way as to avoid 
any damage to adjoining property. The question thus presented 
is even assuming Article I, Section 22 were self-executing, 
could the City be liable under Utah law where the City did not 
deliberately take private property for public use, nor did it 
cause necessary or unavoidable damages to property by its 
action, but private property was nonetheless allegedly damaged 
by negligence. 
Initially, it should be noted that interpreting Article I, 
Section 22 as requiring compensation where property is damaged 
unintentionally and unnecessarily by municipal action is incon-
sistent with the language of the provision itself. That provi-
sion requires governmental entities to pay just compensation 
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for private property damaged "for public use." It must be 
assumed according to the standard rules of statutory interpre-
tation cited previously that the legislature used those terms 
advisedly. Board of Ed. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake 
County and Grant v. Utah State Land Board, supra. Nevertheless, 
plaintiff's property was not damaged "for" public use, rather 
plaintiff alleges it was damaged "by" public use, inadvertently, 
negligently, without purpose, and without any benefit to the 
public whatsoever. See, e.g., Chavez v. City of Laramie, 389 
P.2d 23, 24 (Wyo. 1964) ("According to the constitutional 
provision set out above [plaintiffs] would be entitled to 
compensation from the public only if they allege and prove their 
property was damaged 'for public . . . use.'"). 
Subsequent legislative acts also indicate that Utah's emi-
nent domain law requires compensation only for property damaged 
deliberately, or for property that is damaged as a necessary 
consequence, rather than as an unintentional consequence of gov-
ernmental action. In 1987 the legislature enacted § 63-30-10.5, 
discussed above. Employing the language of the constitutional 
provision at issue, that section waives immunity for taking or 
damaging private property and provides that "compensation and 
damages should be assessed according to the requirements of 
Chapter 34, Title 78." See, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 (1987). 
Title 78 then expressly provides that payment for the taking 
and damaging of private property can only be obtained where the 
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damage is unavoidable, or a necessary consequence of the public 
use. Section 78-34-4 provides in pertinent part: 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
1. that the use to which it is to be applied is 
a use authorized by law; 
2. that the taking is necessary to such use 
• i • • 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1981). Further, § 78-34-10 states 
that, "if the property, though no part thereof is taken, will 
be damaged by the construction of the proposed improvement, the 
amount of such damages [must be assessed]." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-10(3) (1953). Sin' unintentional, unnecessary or 
negligent damages cannot t^ assessed before construction of a 
proposed improvement, and the language of the above cited 
sections contemplates "necessary" damages and payment for 
property that "will be damaged" by construction, the plain 
legislative intent is that unintentional, unnecessary or 
negligent damages are not compensable in an imminent domain 
proceeding. See, e.g., Thomas E. Jeremy Estate v. Salt Lake 
City, 49 P.2d 405 (Utah 1935) ("Damages arising out of the 
carelessness or negligence or indifference in the construction 
of a utility upon land taken for public use are not damages 
contemplated by the statutes as recoverable under the 
principles of law pertaining to eminent domain proceedings"). 
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Consistent with the legislative intent described above, this 
Court has repeatedly stated that accidental or negligent injury 
to private property by government action is not compensable 
under Article I, Section 22. In Lund v. Salt Lake County, 200 
P. 510 (Utah 1921), plaintiffs sued to recover damages for 
injury to certain fish ponds and destruction of fish alleged to 
have resulted from the County's flushing of water through a re-
servoir owned and controlled by the County. Apparently, water 
released by the County entered an overflow ditch and eventually 
reached plaintiff's pond. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's claim under 
Article I, Section 22. Fundamental principles of that law, said 
the Court, require that the property taken be taken for a public 
use, that the structural work causing injury be for a public 
purpose, that it be authorized by law, and that the damage for 
which compensation was claimed be a necessary consequence of the 
public use. 
We are clearly of the opinion that the damages for 
which compensation is allowed under Article I, 
Section 22 of the State Constitution are such as are 
the direct consequences of the lawful exercise of the 
right of eminent domain, and that ordinarily such 
damages are unavoidable. 
Id. at 514. 
Subsequently, even Justice Wade, who was the most adament 
that Article I, Section 22 was self-executing and thus allowed 
a suit in inverse condemnation, would not permit such a suit to 
-24-
extend to cases alleging only unintentional and unnecessary 
damages. In his concurring opinion in Springville Banking, he 
wrote: 
Such compensation must result from or grow out of a 
public use of property, either the property taken or 
other property used for the public purpose . . . . 
Such public use must be one the state is entitled to 
make, and it must be intentionally made by the duly 
constituted public officers and not be merely the 
result of negligence or other wrongful acts which 
create ordinary tort liability. 
Springville Banking, 349 P.2d at 166. 
In his dissent in Fairclough, Justice Wade wrote: 
This provision [Article I, Section 22] clearly requires 
the damaging of tangible private property, and that the 
public use must be intentional and not merely acciden-
tal or negligently caused. So damages from personal 
injuries or from breach of contract and all damages 
except from an intentional public use are not included 
in such consent . . . . 
. . . [I]t is generally recognized that accidental or 
negligent injury is not a damage to private property 
for public use. 
Fairclough,. 354 P.2d at 110-11 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff's responds to Lund v. Salt Lake County and the 
other cases cited above by attempting to distinguish the facts 
relied on by the court in Lund from the facts of the instant 
case. Plaintiff argues that the governmental act in Lund, the 
release of water from a reservoir, was simply the "ministerial" 
performance of a public function. However, there is no logical 
basis for plaintiff's distinction. 
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The governmental action in this case, the lining of a stream 
channel with concrete for flood control purposes, is just as 
"ministerial" or is just as much a "mere public function" as the 
flushing of water through the County owned reservoir in Lund. 
The critical fact common to both cases is that the government 
activity was pursuant to a purely public duty and that the acti-
vity resulted in damages that were wholly unintentional and 
unnecessary to the proper performance of the activity. Where 
damage so wrought is not a necessary consequence or result of a 
public undertaking, the claim for damages is a claim in tort and 
should not be given constitutional status. See, e.g., Harris v. 
United States, 205 F.2d 765, 767-68 (10th Cir. 1953); Chavez v. 
City of Laramie, 389 P.2d 23, 25 (Wyo. 1964); Dallas County 
Flood Control District v. Benson, 306 S.W.2d 350, 351 (Tex. 
1937). 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
§ 63-30-10.5 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
The City maintains that § 63-30-10.5 does not apply to this 
case for several reasons: (1) the statute gives rise to a new 
cause of action which did not exist prior to 1987 and thus cannot 
be applied retroactively; (2) the statute does not contemplate 
suits where damages are not a necessary, unavoidable consequence 
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of the governmental activity; and (3) the Governmental Immunity 
Act itself does not apply the waiver of § 63-30-10.5 to suits 
where damages were caused by the management of flood waters. 
The principles relating to retroactive application of laws 
enacted by the legislature are settled. As stated in Oakland 
Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 520 P.2d 108 (Utah 1974), 
a later statute or amendment should not be applied in a retro-
active manner to impose a greater liability upon a party unless 
the later statute or amendment deals only with a clarification 
or amplification as to how the law should have been understood 
prior to its enactment. In Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial 
Comm., 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986), this Court stated: 
[T]he law establishing substantive rights and liabil-
ities when a cause of action arises, and not a 
subsequently enacted statute, governs the resolution 
of a dispute . . . . [H]owever, statutes which are 
procedural only and do not create, alter or destroy 
substantive rights may be applied to causes of action 
that have accrued or are pending at the time the 
statute is enacted. 
725 P.2d at 1336-37. 
In the instant case, prior to 1987 the law was clear that 
sovereign immunity barred a suit against a governmental entity 
for taking or damaging private property for public use. The 
1987 enactment of § 63-30-10.5 waived such immunity with respect 
to certain governmental activities, and thus created a substan-
tive right to sue governmental entities which theretofore had 
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not existed. According to the principles cited above, it should 
not be applied retroactively to this case, where the project in 
question was undertaken in 1985, two years before the amendment. 
Secondly, § 63-30-10.5 expressly limits the damages recover-
able thereunder by reference to Chapter 34, Title 78 of the Utah 
Code. That title and chapter expressly provides that compensa-
tion for taking and damaging is only recoverable where the 
damages are: (1) authorized by law, (2) necessary to such use, 
and (3) contemplated in advance of the improvement. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-34-4, and 78-34-10(3).2 In this case, where 
the damages alleged are merely accidentally or negligently 
caused, they are not recoverable under § 63-30-10.5. 
Finally, the legislature has restricted the enabling effect 
of § 63-30-10.5 by placing it in the Act as a waiver of immu-
nity. As a waiver of immunity, it applies only where the appli-
cable immunity is qualified. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1). 
Section 63-30-10.5 and all other express waivers of immunity 
have no application where the immunity in force is absolute. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(2). Only where the government 
taking or damaging results from exercises of government func-
tions other than those governmental functions enumerated in the 
2Such an interpretation of §§ 78-34-4 and 78-34-10(s) is 
consistent with the language of constitutional provisions 
requiring compensation for damages "for public use." See 
Section 11(B) supra. 
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second paragraph of § 63-30-3 does § 63-30-10.5 enable suit in 
accordance with Article I, Section 22. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO BASIS FOR AN IMPLIED 
CONTRACT CLAIM AGAINST BOUNTIFUL CITY. 
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent governmental immunity by 
bootstrapping its rights as the owner of a servient tenement 
into a breach of contract claim against the City. See 
Plaintiff's Brief at pp. 40-42. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff's contract claim is based wholly 
upon a right-of-way agreement, copies of which were attached to 
both the City's and plaintiff's original memoranda. The docu-
ment is nothing more than an easement granted by the plaintiff 
to the City to perform the various flood control work which 
plaintiff had requested of the City. Under the express terms 
of the right-of-way agreement, the City has no obligations. 
The City did not even sign the document. 
Plaintiff cites Bracklein v. Realty Ins. Co., 80 P.2d 431, 
477 (Utah 1948), to support its proposition that accepting an 
easement creates contractual obligations. See Plaintiff's 
Brief, at p. 41. Nevertheless, in Bracklein, the Court merely 
held that a grantee's acceptance of a deed containing a mort-
gage assumption clause makes the obligations created by the deed 
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a written contract, and not subject to limitations periods 
governing oral contracts. 80 P.2d at 477. Clearly, Bracklein 
is distinguishable. There is no agreement between the City and 
plaintiff creating enforceable contract rights and remedies suf-
ficient to allow this case to fall within the waiver of govern-
mental immunity for contractual obligations. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY HELD THAT PLAINTIFF 
HAS NOT AND CANNOT ALLEGE A "TAKING" UNDER THE 
FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
In contrast to the confusing array of cases interpreting 
state constitutions requiring just compensation for "taking or 
damaging" private property, it has long been established under 
the Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution that a govern-
mental entity is not liable for unnecessary or tortious damages 
resulting from a governmental activity. See e.g., Transportation 
Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879); Gibson v. United States, 166 
U.S. 269 (1897); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 
U.S. 373 (1945). Thus, under the Fifth Amendment "the essential 
inquiry is whether the injury to the claimant's property is in 
the nature of a tortious invasion of his rights or rises to the 
magnitude of an appropriation of some interest in his property 
permanently to the use of the government." National Byproducts, 
Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1273-74 (Ct. CI. 1969). 
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In this case, plaintiff has alleged and could allege only 
unintended, unnecessary and wholly avoidable damages resulting 
from the City's acts. Plaintiff does not allege that the City 
has acquired any of its property even temporarily for public 
use. Such allegations, even if proven, establish only tortious 
injury to plaintiff's property by a governmental entity. Such 
allegations are not sufficient to state a taking claim under the 
Fifth Amendment of the federal constitution. 
This conclusion is in accord with principles long esta-
blished by the Supreme Court in analogous cases. In Sanguinetti 
v. United States, 264 U.S. 146 (1924), a governmental entity 
authorized construction of a connecting canal over plaintiff's 
property and between two bodies of water. The canal was con-
structed in accordance with plans prepared by government 
engineers who apparently believed that the capacity of the canal 
would prove sufficient under all circumstances. However, during 
several successive high water years, the canal was insufficient-
ly large to carry away flood waters. The canal overflowed the 
lands of the plaintiff, damaging and destroying crops and trees 
and injuring to some extent the land itself. None of the land 
was permanently flooded, however. 264 U.S. at 146-47. 
Plaintiff brought suit for a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 
Citing earlier decisions on the issue, the Supreme Court 
noted as follows: 
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In order to create an enforceable liability 
against the government, it is, at least, necessary 
that the overflow be the direct result of the struc-
ture, and constitute an actual, permanent invasion of 
the land, amounting to an appropriation of, and not 
merely an injury to, the property. 
264 U.S. at 149 (citations omitted.) The Court found the refer-
enced conditions not met and held that because the plaintiff was 
not ousted from his land, nor the customary use of his land pre-
vented, his injury was, in its nature, indirectly consequential, 
for which no implied obligation on the part of the government 
could arise under the Fifth Amendment. Id* at 150. 
Other courts have followed Sanguinetti in cases substantial-
ly analogous to the instant case, stating the general rule that 
under such circumstances, there has been no "taking" under the 
Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 P.2d 
857 (6th Cir. 1978) ("When a land owner is damaged by release 
of water through a dam, or a change in flooding patterns is 
caused by construction of levies, courts have frequently denied 
compensation, saying that the flood involves at most a tort, not 
a taking."); Hartwiq v. United States, 485 F.2d 615 (Ct. CI. 
1973) (finding plaintiff's allegations insufficient to make a 
Fifth Amendment taking claim since plaintiffs did not show that 
their property would be subjected to inevitably recurring 
flooding due to the action of the government); National 
Byproducts Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256 (Ct. CI. 1969) 
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("Courts have held that one, two or three floodings by 
themselves do not constitute a taking. The plaintiff must esta-
blish that the flooding will 'inevitably recur.'"); Fromme v. 
United States, 412 F.2d 1192, 1196 (Ct. CI. 1969) ("one flooding 
. . . or two floodings . . . cannot be regarded as a taking of 
a permanent interest in the affected land."). 
In its brief, plaintiff does not dispute the rule stated 
above, but appears to argue that because Bountiful City's 
alleged action has had a negative economic impact on plaintiff's 
investment in the mall property, there may be some state of 
facts provable in support of it's claim. See Appellant's Brief, 
at 39. To the extent plaintiff is arguing that damage to and 
depreciation in value of property alone can constitute a 
"taking" under the Fifth Amendment, its position is clearly con-
trary to the Supreme Court decisions uniformly rejecting such 
arguments. See e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (previous decisions "uniformly 
reject the proposition that diminution in property value, 
standing alone, can establish a 'taking.'") (citing Euclid v. 
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (76% diminution in value 
not a taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 238 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5% 
diminution in value not a taking). 
In sum, by its Fifth Amendment claim, plaintiff asks this 
Court to adopt a position taken by no other court plaintiff can 
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point to, and hold that damages caused by a single flooding, 
which did not permanently invade plaintiff's property, or com-
pletely destroy it, and where there is no allegation that the 
flooding will ever recur, constitute a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment. By contrast, the great weight of authority holds 
that such alleged damages, even if proven, do not rise to the 
level of a taking. Thus, the City respectfully submits that 
plaintiff's taking claim under the Fifth Amendment was 
appropriately dismissed as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court below correctly 
dismissed causes of action in plaintiff's Complaint and First 
Amended Complaint against the City as a matter of law. The 
City respectfully submits that the judgment of the Court below 
should be upheld. 
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